National identity: political aspect just as vital

By JAMES GOMEZ

LINKED to 18th-century European nationalism, two ideas are important in a definition of national identity. A vertical identification with a political unit which includes political participation and a horizontal connection between the different groups in a unit which stresses cultural commonality.

National identity as a concept is external to the region. Historically, South-east Asia comprised village communities.

Political authority was not centralised and was projected only as far as the military forces could venture.

This explained the rather fluid nature of migration and non-attachment to political authority and territory in the pre-colonial days.

It was the advent of colonialism that changed this state of affairs.

The Europeans fixed territorial boundaries and centralised authority in South-east Asia. The Japanese Occupation afterwards strengthened these basic features.

The years after the war saw many of the former colonies become independent states. Almost all immediately embarked on the task of constructing a nation.

Political leaders employed the eurocentric view that national identity was something homogenous, fixed and overarching.

The accepted wisdom of the times was that a properly managed nation-building programme would over time facilitate the emergence of a common cultural identity.

Each country, thus, strove to find the correct formula to realise a national identity.

Indonesia focused on the citizen's commitment to the five principles of Pancasila as the basis of its identity.

Malaysia opted for consociationalism with an emphasis on Malay culture as the vehicle of common bonding.

Singapore chose the development of a supra-ethnic national identity through meritocracy, and modernisation as a way to rise above primordial differences.

While Thailand and Myanmar, for instance, anchored theirs on the idea of an ethnonation which derived its support from kin-based communities.

In all these instances, the focus was purely on the cultural dimension.

Political participation was seen in most cases as antithetical to economic development and not a necessary component of national identity.

The situation has not changed much in spite of challenges posed by increasing globalisation, the growing presence of non-Asians in the region, emerging differences in world view, widening use of the English language, rise in inter-cultural marriages, increased cross-border migration and the continued demand for greater political participation in contemporary South-east Asia.

Why is this so?

One explanation can be found in the way the term national identity is used in South-east Asia.

Conceived in purely ethnic and cultural terms, the political dimension is often ignored. For instance, recognising that societies are increasingly plural, policy-makers in Indonesia are stressing the theme Unity In diversity.

In Malaysia, it is Bangsa Malaysia, and in Singapore, it is Shared Values.

These strategies try to find a solution for internal cultural difference to gain some expression and to be accommodated into the national whole.

The underlying aim is to keep the citizenry committed to the political authority and territory by providing cultural concessions.

The emphasis on "culture", however, disregards the political conveniently. For instance, border clashes between government troops and minority groups in Myanmar, Thailand and the Philippines are seen in ethnic terms when, in reality, such aggressive acts are connected to demands by minority groups for greater political representation or autonomy in a majority-dominated political environment.

Without political involvement, these groups become less committed to political authority and a fixed boundary.

Political authorities in the region are uncomfortable in allowing those who do not share the dominant ideological space from gelling onto the political platform.

Since the '90s, several countries in the region have claimed Asian values as the reason to pursue political conservatism.

However, by keeping political representations select, South-east Asian leaders fail to understand that one of the reasons why nation-building programmes have not been more successful is that they have been reluctant to incorporate the political.

For instance, although Golkar in Indonesia, Barisan Nasional in Malaysia and the People's Action Party in Singapore have tried to have a large cross-section of interests under their banners, the fact remains that the electoral system and systems of representations in each country, even though they have undergone some changes over the years, do not represent satisfactorily all sectors of society.

Polling results show that a significant portion of the citizenry continues to be politically marginalised.

Further adjustments to the existing systems of representations are needed in these countries to incorporate these marginalised elements into the main stream.

By accepting plurality and fluidity not just in cultural representations but also in the political, South-east Asian leaders can prevent nation-building measures to be seen in purely pessimistic terms.

National identity must take into account the demand for increased political participation as well as cultural difference as features of modern societies.

South-east Asian states, as all states around the world, are grappling with issues of globalisation, increasing multiculturalism, transnational migration and demands for political participation.

Each one is faced with new challenges as the modern citizen no longer restricts his or her lifetime to a single political unit. This is evident as the region once again experiences a natural movement of goods and people over boundaries that increasingly go beyond the region.

As a result, there is a need to re-think how people can be held to a political unit and what form such strategies must take as the demands of citizenry change in the contemporary era.

The term national identity can no longer be treated as static and unidimensional. The political aspect is as important as the cultural one for the region.

The writer is a Visiting Associate at the Institute of South-east Asian Studies. He is currently a doctoral candidate of the Department of Political Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies in London.