Fly in the ointment

Asean's decision to make Burma, Cambodia and Laos members from July will present multiple dilemmas for the grouping itself and for its relations with the West.

FOR Asean, the real work is only just beginning. The grouping's decision to embrace Burma despite protests over human-rights abuses along with Cambodia and Laos was only the first step. Now it faces the more formidable task of integrating the new members into a 10-nation bloc and managing its relations with the rest of the world.

Asean won't have to wait long for its first challenge. American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and several European foreign ministers all of whom opposed Burma's admission will hold talks with their Asean counterparts in Kuala Lumpur in late July, a day or two after the new members are admitted. The presence of the Burmese could put the Western foreign ministers in a ticklish position.

Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, who announced the May 31 decision to admit the new members, tried to avoid giving the impression that Asean was thumbing its nose at the West. It was not a signal. We signal to nobody, he told journalists at the end of an Asean foreign ministers' meeting in Kuala Lumpur.

But in an apparent attempt to limit the scope for dispute, Badawi said Asean would not assign the new members dialogue partners with nonmember nations. The United States, the European Union, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Korea hold a series of dialogues with Asean members after the bloc's annual meeting. The decision not to give the new members dialogue partners will tend to marginalize them and essentially make them second-string members of Asean, at least for several years.

Another hurdle is the Asia Europe summit in London next year. The British government bars visas to Rangoon's military leaders, which means a dispute may arise over whether Burma will be allowed to attend the summit. A senior European diplomat in Bangkok says the European Parliament is also unlikely to amend the EU's protocol with Asean to recognize Burma's membership in the grouping. This could complicate future dealings between the two blocs.

Other countries such as Canada and Japan provide aid to Asean but refuse or restrict bilateral assistance to Burma. Asean, however, doesn't allow donors to exclude any of its members from aid programmes for the grouping. But no Canadian politician will risk signing an agreement with Slorc, predicts Abdul Razak Baginda, head of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. (Slorc stands for the State Law and Order Restoration Council, Burma's ruling military junta.) Integration of the new members into Asean could prove equally daunting. Admission is easy, says Razak. But when the hullabaloo ends will the new members be able to send personnel to 280 meetings a year? Observers believe this will be easier for Burma, which has more English speaking diplomats, than poorer, smaller Laos and Cambodia.

Economic cooperation could pose additional problems. Badawi said the three new members would be given 10 years from January 1998 to comply with the tariff-reduction schedule mandated by the Asean Free Trade Area, or Afta. The other members have until 2003 to lower tariffs on 98 pecent of their traded goods to below 5 percent. Vietnam, which joined Asean in mid-1995, has been given until 2006.

Asean's membership explosion could also result in internal political tensions. It will be more difficult to maintain the cohesion of 10 disparate countries, says Lee Poh Ping, an international-affairs specialist at the University of Malaya. He points out that Asean's six older members are more developed and have long practised market economics, whereas Burma, Cambodia and Laos have long been isolated from international markets. There's bound to be a clash of cultures, Lee says.

Burma's growing economic and military ties with China could be one of the first tests for an enlarged Asean. China is very close to Myanmar, says another analyst in Kuala Lumpur, using the military leadership's name for Burma. If the Spratlys become a problem, he says, referring to islands in the South China Sea claimed by China and several Asean members, what will Myanmar's position be?

Burma did nothing to help Asean rebut American opposition in the run up to the foreign ministers' meeting. In recent months, Rangoon has restricted the activities of opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and detained more than 300 members of her National League for Democracy, most of whom were only released on June 3. In a videotape smuggled out of Burma just before the Asean meeting, Suu Kyi said that Asean membership would make Rangoon's military leaders even more obdurate and oppressive.

Asean officials insist that their decision to embrace Burma had nothing to do with giving Rangoon a good-housekeeping seal of approval. Instead, they say, it is a continuation of their policy of constructive engagement, which emphasizes economic cooperation and downplays political issues.

And what if the human-rights situation in Burma worsens after its Asean membership? Now that Myanmar will be a member of Asean, Asean's policy of constructive engagement, which we will continue to pursue, will be more effective, I hope, Malaysia's Badawi told journalists.

The three countries will be formally admitted at an Asean foreign ministers' meeting hosted by Malaysia in July. Observers say this year, the 30th anniversary of Asean's founding, provided a convenient peg for expanding membership. It's very symbolic, says Razak. If you have no fixed criteria for admitting new members, you have to fall back on certain events.

Washington had been working behind the scenes for months to persuade Asean governments to proceed slowly on Burma's admission. On April 25, State Department spokesman Nicholas Burns told reporters that the US was trying to use our influence to make the point that Burma should be given a stiff message that it is not welcome. His words provoked a strong reaction from Asean, prompting Washington to soften the wording of its opposition by acknowledging that membership was a matter for Asean to decide.

Analysts and diplomats differ on the impact of Washington's lobbying efforts on Asean's decision to admit Burma. A senior Asean official says American opposition was only a minor consideration. He says delaying the decision until December, as some had suggested, was ruled out because it wouldn't have made the issue any less sensitive.

Others believe Washington's tactics speeded up Rangoon's admission. The attempt by the US to pressure Asean got the opposite result, says Razak of the Malaysian Strategic Research Centre. Asean became more resolved to unite Southeast Asia.

In the US, analysts downplay the extent of the damage. Some argue that the American cause was lost because Washington hadn't tried hard enough to coordinate its Burma policy with Asean. The Clinton administration could have done better working with Asean by saying: " We will delay sanctions if you delay membership," says Douglas Paal of the Asia-Pacific Policy Centre, an independent think tank.

A Democratic staffer in the House says that some American congressmen may ask Secretary of State Albright to boycott the Asean meeting in Kuala Lumpur in July. But even though she described Slorc as an ugly acronym for an ugly government in 1995, most analysts believe she will attend because of the importance Washington places on its ties with Asean.

Still, no one expects the criticism of Rangoon to end after it joins Asean. Asean countries made a big mistake, but this is by no means the end of the battle over Burma or the end of our relations with Asean, says a Republican congressional aide in Washington.

Since the decision on the new members, American officials have stressed that Washington and Asean have the same objectives with regard to Burma, but differ on how to achieve them. According to John Dinger, a State Department spokesman, We now look to Asean to use its good offices to urge the Slorc to seriously address our mutual concerns and urge the Slorc to enter into a productive dialogue with democratic forces in Burma.

Robert Manning of the Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington think tank, believes that US Asean relations will be tense for a while, but foresees no long-term damage. When push comes to shove and they dial 911 (an emergency number), who're they gonna call? he asks. America is Asean's only option, he says.

Singapore's ambassador to Washington, Chan Heng Chee, puts it differently: The US sees Asean as an important strategic friend. Now the Asean-10 is Southeast Asia and it's inconceivable that the US would not want a relationship with Southeast Asia. We share a congruent interest in maintaining peace and stability.