In the 1980s, core states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations--Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and more recently Vietnam--began gradually to shift their security focus from internal to external concerns, particularly in securing territorial waters, 200-mile exclusive economic zones and trade-related sea-lanes.

The onset of the Asian financial crisis, however, put a halt to that process. Thailand cut its defence budget by 30 percent in 1998, while its budget last year was the lowest in recent history. Malaysia cut its 1998 budget by $250 million and cancelled all air-defence exercises, while the Philippine military's modernization campaign all but ceased. Indonesia halved its defence budget.

Now, regional militaries have started spending again. Examples abound: Last month, Thailand purchased 18 used F-16 fighters from the United States. Soon after, Indonesia announced plans to buy used Russian aircraft with gunship and anti-submarine capabilities. Malaysia plans to purchase at least one diesel-powered submarine, probably from Sweden. And in March, India agreed to help Vietnam set up a defence industry, which could include the local production of missiles. Meanwhile, the perceived need to introduce electronic warfare, better command-and-control communications, and intelligence capabilities are pressing on all regional military planners. Yet unfortunately the revival of arms spending comes when most countries in the region most need to direct precious national resources toward rebuilding their battered economies.

KEEPING UP WITH THE NEIGHBOURS

The persistent lack of transparency in Asian defence procurement is resurrecting fears that arms purchases could destabilize the region. Derek da Cunha, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, says an "action-reaction phenomenon" is already driving the early stages of the renewed build-up. "As one country introduces the latest weapon system, others view that as a new benchmark which their armed forces should attempt to meet," says da Cunha.

Sheldon Simon, an expert in Asean security issues at Arizona State University, believes that suspicion about new arms purchases is already growing among rival Asean states--the fear being that one country may be taking advantage of a neighbour's economic plight to gain a strategic edge. For example, while all other states in the region were slashing military budgets, Singapore held its arms spending relatively steady at 6% of GDP throughout the crisis. During that time, it purchased four used submarines and 12 new F-16 fighters equipped with advanced global positioning systems, making Singapore's air force the most modern in the region, according to Simon. Analysts say this provided an impetus for Thailand's recent F-16 purchase and Indonesia's plans to buy Russian fighters.

With public-debt figures ballooning and economic recovery still tenuous, most Asean countries can ill afford to be drawn into competitive arms spending, even if this new round focuses on used rather than new equipment. Yet recent events suggest that competition is exactly what's happening. Amitav Acharya, associate professor at York University in Toronto and an expert on Southeast Asian security, believes the new build-up is being driven in general by "strategic uncertainty," not well-considered modernization programmes.

In part, that uncertainty is fuelled by the growing arms race in Northeast Asia. In particular, China's shift toward a more aggressive and outward-oriented defence posture in recent years--particularly the proliferation of land-based cruise missiles--is starting to cause jitters among Southeast Asian countries about Beijing's long-term strategic intentions in the region. "The arms race in Northeast Asia between China and Taiwan over TMD is quickly being transposed into the South China Sea and Southeast Asia," Carlyle Thayer, a regional security analyst at the Asia-Pacific Centre for Security Studies in Hawaii, says of the controversial U.S. plans for a theatre missile defence system.

Thayer notes that China is presently developing the ability to mount better-integrated operations in the South China Sea. Those plans include the introduction of a new generation of fighter aircraft capable of in-flight refuelling, guided-missile frigates and two new classes of nuclear submarines.

Military analysts warn that a potential shift in the balance of power in the South China Sea will spur greater arms spending among Southeast Asian countries with competing claims in the Spratly Islands. These include the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, and possibly Indonesia, since it claims the adjacent Natuna gas field.

That spending will enhance Southeast Asian countries' offensive capabilities. And with the increased introduction of multi-role strike aircraft and submarines to patrol contentious borders, the potential for accidental head-to-head confrontations will grow.

"Conflicts in the region will no longer be a couple of guys with machine guns on a fishing boat," says Robert Karniol, Asia-Pacific editor of Jane's Defence Weekly. "We're now talking about surface-to-surface missiles on naval ships." Meanwhile, Thayer doubts that any country in the region has the command-and-control capabilities to effectively control its navy during a mini-crisis.

Yet Asean nations have made progress recently in developing regional cooperative mechanisms to control potential crises, including enhanced military-to-military contacts and joint naval patrols. For example, Malaysia and Indonesia are working together to control pirates in the Strait of Malacca. They are also making headway for the first time in identifying areas of mutual security concern and finding ways to address them multilaterally.

But substantive cooperation in containing a regional arms build-up is still a long way off. Karniol says the Asian Regional Forum, Asean's security organization, has been "virtually useless" in developing a coordinated regional arms-control mechanism, due to a lack of political will. To date, Asean has not established a regional arms register that would require reporting of current weapons holdings and domestic production.

Indeed, for years Asean-driven security discussions have stalled at early stages without consultative bodies being set up to address arms build-ups. Exchanges of defence information among Asean nations are still minimal. Instead, they seem content to rely on traditional webs of overlapping bilateral relations. Unfortunately, such webs usually lack transparency and often feed, rather than dispel, regional rivalries.

"Without more white papers and open-ended discussions about what countries are buying and why, the situation will always be tense and riddled with suspicion," says a Western military attaché in Bangkok. Until that changes, the risk of a full-blown Southeast Asian arms race will only grow