| 'Marxist
plot' revisited Introduction Part 1: Relating of the facts: May – September 1987 Part 2: Initial reactions of the Church of Singapore Conclusion: Concluding Reflections (Below)
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| What
is most probable
At the time of writing (late 1987), no one knows towards what new development or conclusion the affair will now be directed. We therefore have to be prudent and draw only the conclusions that exist at the present moment while remarking for each of them its degree of certitude or probability…The account of the events which we have tried to present with as little prejudice as possible make some of them more than probable. We shall begin with these… Among the conclusions we are able to draw with the greatest assurance are, first of all, the impossibility of believing the theory of a “Marxist plot” which was given during the whole of the affair by the highest Singapore authorities. During these four months, it underwent too many variations and modifications, and during the month of September, it was even in a manner, weakened by a member of the government. Nobody wants Singapore to become a Marxist State (it is the case with us and it was also the case with the chief accused, Vincent Cheng, who declared that explicitly), we can recognise Communism as enemy number one of the regime (this was the legitimate appreciation of the authorities of Singapore) even while we refuse to follow the Singapore regime in this false and incoherent construction which they never succeeded in rendering coherent simply because it would seem, they failed to believe it really themselves. Two other conclusions could be drawn with a great deal of probability that, also derive from the first. First of all, the Singapore regime has a problem when it comes to dealing with any opposition, even if it is a minority, as was this affair as it was represented by the members of the so-called plot. If the opposition of the young people implicated in this affair was the sign of the dissatisfaction of a certain well-informed middle class, as indeed the government readily concedes, then the violent and brutal reaction of that same government manifested that perhaps the relationship between the State and the civil society which it manages with an efficacy which all observers readily admit, are no longer all that harmonious. The second conclusion concerns a certain interference between the domain of the civil society which make up the “management” of the State and activities inspired by religious ideals, and more particularly, Christian ideals. That much was evident during the whole course of the affair. The young people and the priests whose activities had been considered as subversive and dangerous for the security of the State were for the majority among them militants within the framework and under the direction of Christian groups or associations. They were told to: “Remain in your own domain!” and to “Give to Caesar what belongs to Caesar and to God what belongs to God”, or again, let “the Church attend to the ends which belonged to her”. Underlying the whole affair we could see the outlines of a rivalry of competence, loudly proclaimed in the declarations coming from the government (we have only to recall the first confrontation of the Prime Minister and Archbishop Gregory Yong, the attacks on Liberation Theology, the speech of Lee Kuan Yew on the occasion of the national day), but also implicitly recognised in the changing of attitude of the archbishop and the declarations of Vincent Cheng and the others during their so-called confessions. What is probable In trying now to make some sense of the whole affair, in trying to understand it in the context of the social and political system of Singapore, we penetrate into the domain of explanations by hypothesis, and consequently of what is probable. Among the conclusions that we offered above, the last two deserve more ample reflection and they might perhaps shed more light on it for us. We mean the problems offered to the State through its opposition and what we have termed a rivalry of competence between those responsible for the management of the State and religious-inspired movements. We questioned their respective statutes after having made a detour by an analysis of what one could call the Singapore socio-political System, a term we borrow in part from John Clamer in his book Singapore, ideology and society. (9) The Singapore System A description of the Singapore society in its social and also its political organisation presents big difficulties. Indeed, none of the categories that generally serve under the classification of political regimes and their relationship with society can be adopted entirely. Thus, in prinicipal, the State of Singapore gave itself all the institutions of a parliamentary democracy. However, in reality, it does not function as a democracy without one being able in all cases, to classify it in the category of dictatorships…nor, among totalitarian states either. Singapore has a particular way of living its relationship between the State and society. John Clamer tried to study its society and power structure within one only system where the civil Society and the State referred to one another. One being unable to comprehend matters without the other and reciprocally. The idea of the predominance of the State is what applies to this system. It is not only the idea that the State has of itself, but also the idea which the population has made of it, and also the idea which shows itself from the way institutions, the administration, enterprises and the educational system function. This universal role of the State is justified from two points of view: the political stability of a community that is multicultural, multiracial, multireligious, and the management of an economical progress that demands a high level of centralisation and organisation. Yet another element joins all those: the Confucian culture which dictates the behaviour of a majority of the population lends itself very well to this paternalistic conception of the State; people could not but trust those who govern and were believed to be incapable of indicating anything but what was good. Undoubtedly, the events which are the object of this dossier are due to a crack in this unanimity. To all that should be added the fact that the chief reference to all the actions of the State was the economy. It enjoyed an absolute priority. The State was, par excellence, the manager of the economy, and it was as such that it exercised its administration of all the other domains of the society. One of the paradoxes of this State that was violently anti-Communist was that it had a vision which was originally Marxist, of a society in which the economical infrastructure determined all the other ideological superstructures, including the vision of man isolated in his role of homo economicus. This practical materialism brought on two consequences: first, that which was called “social engineering”, the attempt to fashion man and prescribe the mode of his conduct according to the immediate needs (of the State). It is to this attitude that we can attribute the very troubling variations in the order of moral values displayed by the government. This is clearly visible in its politics for births and its preoccupation with eugenics. Abortion, which was strongly encouraged in the ’70s became, a few years later, altogether discouraged. The norms in vigour varied not only with time, but also according to the social classes. Couples of the middle-classes were encouraged to have 2, 3, 4 children, whereas poor parents were offered a bonus of $10,000 if they would get themselves sterilised. The educated young were strongly encouraged to get married within their own ranks whereas immigrant workers were forbidden to marry Singaporeans. It would be an economical suicide for the “good genes” which educated people bore were dissolved by being mixed with the “bad genes” which were contained in the poor. The second consequence of this practical materialism, this preponderance of the economical order, casts a slur over the whole traditional political sphere. If everything was subject to management, and rigorous administration, then there was no room for political choices and therefore for any real opposition. Even the word “politics” took on a negative connotation, so much so that, as a Singapore intellectual affirmed, there was no longer any “political personnel, but a managing bureaucracy”. The State of the Opposition Yet, the power representatives insisted that political opposition did exist in Singapore. There were several legal opposition parties of which the best known were the Workers' Party, and the Singapore Democratic Party. When a member of this last-named Party, CHIAM SEE TONG placed a motion at the July parliamentary session asking for the immediate release of the detainees, accompanied by a vigorous plea on behalf of the young people implicated in the affair, several members of the government underlined that this peaceful constitutional opposition had the right to be expressed and that it was being expressed…What was condemned, was opposition that had recourse to violence, to Communist methods, which attacked the security of the State. In fact, the reactions of the authorities during this parliamentary debate presented a typical case of what John Clamer called the illusion of a parliamentary democracy. Despite the numerous references to Anglo-Saxon parliamentary methods, this so-called legal opposition moved in an artificial field without any real effect on the decisions adopted and without any possibility of opening up eventual reforms. The true Singapore universe was the one which we have described above, the one in which the omnipresent vigilance of the State dominated. There, all real opposition collided with the divine mandate conferred upon the State, not only by its Confucian heritage, but also by the Marxist-type priority accorded to the economy. That was what had been questioned by the action of the educated young people from the middle classes who had been implicated in the so-called “plot”. Their activities took exception precisely to certain forms of “social engineering” , eugenist directives and the marginalisation of immigrant workers. We are then able to understand the violent reaction of the authorities and their theory of a plot. All the more so as this group of educated young people exercised a certain influence beyond the middle classes, in some legal circles, which also threatened the interior of the Workers' Party, where they were relatively active, to transform legal opposition into a true opposition. The Religious Situation The description of the socio-political system given above will help us to understand the warning given to the Catholic Church and, no doubt, to all other religions, at the time of this affair. It might even have been the chief objective of the authorities. It was, in any case, what three Muslim associations of Singapore understood when, after the speech of Lee Kuan Yew for the National Day, they announced their intention of leaving the Central Council of Malaysian cultural organisations, for fear of finding themselves immersed in politics. This warning meant that the authorities saw in some religious activities which were new in their eyes, a threat of a serious malfunctioning for the actual system. The State was, in fact, far from indifferent to the different religions practiced in the country, despite the avowed materialism it was leading. Religion held a large place in the life of the people. For some, the Sikhs, the Malays, the Parsees, it even entered into the definition of their identities. For others, it was an element of their culture. Finally, for Christians, it occupied a large place in their motivations in their spiritual, social and cultural life. The State was not in the least interested in the system of beliefs as long as they did not oppose what was perceived as being in the interest of the nation. Thus, the liberty of religion was proclaimed in regard to the great religions with certain exceptions: Scientology was forbidden, the Mormons were scarcely tolerated and Jehovah’s Witnesses were persecuted. Nevertheless, the State had a very clear idea of the humanising role that religion played within the society. For the State, they were a source of social control; they also retained the moral values necessary for the preservation of a certain human equilibrium. Above all, they were an indispensable antidote to the risks of dehumanisation that excesses of technology and socialisation could bring about. That was why if they were wary of the social orientations of the great religions, they encouraged the privatisation and moral orientation of the beliefs. The pietist form of Christianity propagated by Billy Graham during a crusade in December 1979, met with a very great success and it corresponded to the exact image of religion which the State had of it. Whereas the State fixed very clearly in this way the assigned function accorded to religion in society where they assumed both control and management, some sectors of the Church in Singapore were moving in the opposite direction. Contrary to the declarations which were published during the affair, these activists drew their inspiration more from documents like the Second Vatican CouncilI’s Gaudium et Spes” rather than from Liberation Theology. The Vatican Council’s current of presence in the world and a greater engagement in the transformation of some social structures coincided precisely with the emergence of a new generation, issued in general from the middle classes, which an ever growing dissatisfaction in regard to the society in which they lived, were critical of it and had the will to transform it. It was therefore quite natural for some of these young
to join movements inspired by Christian ideals more capable of welcoming
their new ambitions. That was how a certain sector of the Church in Singapore
found itself to be the bearer of the hopes for changes in a minority part
– it has to be admitted – of the young people of the country…It was also
for this very reason, they would find themselves in conflict with the State
as we have related in this dossier. Other sources: Magazines, books and other documents: -Particular sources and private conversations |
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