It is widely recognised that Singapore has a top class -- some might say draconian -- internal security apparatus.

After all, its Internal Security Department has the power to detain suspects for up to two years without trial. Given past concerns about Islamic extremism in Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and The Philippines, it's not surprising that Western nations considered Singapore a low-risk location.

Indeed, Singapore's security system was one reason why the US Navy was stationed at the island-state. US sailors could go on shore leave without the concerns for their safety that might be the case in other Southeast Asian ports. In addition, about 17,000 Americans live and work in Singapore. Yet it now seems that Singapore had long and well-established Islamic extremist connections. Most of the 15 members of the Jemaah Islamiah (Islamic Group) arrested in Singapore between December 9 and 24, 2001, were Singapore residents. They had links to extremist groups in Malaysia, Indonesia and The Philippines, as well as to al-Qa'ida.

``Mike'', their bomb adviser, was from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in The Philippines. Bomb-making material was stored in Malaysia. Travel to Afghanistan was organised through Malaysian contacts in Negri Sembilan. And some of those involved in the group were Indonesian residents in Malaysia and Singapore with connections to extremists in Indonesia. Jemaah Islamiah had been surveying potential targets in Singapore since 1997 without being detected. Worse still for the ISD, eight members of the group had been to al-Qa'ida training camps in Afghanistan since 1993, disappearing for periods from three to six months without coming to notice.

One member had been three times. Their cover story, if needed, was that they had been attending religious schools in Pakistan.

Cell members helped ``Sammy'' (an Arab al-Qa'ida operative) and ``Mike'' video potential US targets in October 2001, again without being detected. It was ultimately fortunate. After all, that video, obtained from the rubble of an al-Qa'ida house in Afghanistan, alerted US authorities to the danger, and they, in turn, in early December 2001, alerted the initially sceptical Singapore authorities.

It now seems that there were three Jemaah Islamiah cells in Singapore. The targets of one operational cell (Fiah Ayub) were indeed US Navy vessels and US Navy personnel using the MRT transit system, as well as three US companies chosen from a list of 200. Another cell (Fiah Musa) focused on US aircraft and facilities at Paya Lebar Airbase; the diplomatic missions of the US, Israel, the UK and Australia; the Singapore Ministry of Defence complex at Bukit Gombak; and commercial buildings housing US firms. The third cell (Fiah Ismail), which only came into being after September 11, was looking at potential US business targets.

Jemaah Islamiah had already stored 3.9 tonnes of ammonium nitrate, commonly used in large vehicle bombs, and was looking to acquire another 16.7 tonnes. This is an enormous amount when you consider that Timothy McVeigh used only 1.9 tonnes of ammonium nitrate mix at Oklahoma City. The amount of ammonium nitrate being sought would have allowed Jemaah Islamiah to select a large number of targets.

THE flip side to the ISD's failure to detect the activities of Jemaah Islamiah is the excellent security taught and practised by al-Qa'ida cells. For example, while the Jemaah Islamiah members were all devout Muslims, they avoided any mainstream Muslim community activities, such as attending mosques. Good security practices prevented their detection in Singapore, as it had earlier in the US. As we know, the complex and sophisticated September 11 hijack operation was carried through to completion without any detection by well-resourced US federal security and intelligence agencies. What does all of this mean for Australia? Well, there is the issue of the security of our diplomatic missions overseas, particularly those in countries previously thought to be low-risk. It was always believed that Australia, like Singapore, would be a difficult and less attractive working environment for al-Qa'ida. But after Singapore's experience, Australia cannot afford to feel comfortable until we have answered the following tough questions:

Who, from the Australian Islamic community, has been to Pakistan since 1991, ostensibly for religious training?

How long did they go for? What did they do there? Can this be substantiated? And are there any links between individuals here and extremist elements or individuals in Southeast Asia or Pakistan?

Clive Williams is director of terrorism studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre of the Australian National University in Canberra

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