| Asia
Wall Street Journal August 12, 2004 COMMENTARY By CHERIAN GEORGE WHEN a country undergoes only its second leadership change in 45 years, it is natural to think in terms of an epochal shift. When that country is Singapore, however, one probably needs to ratchet down such expectations. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong hands power to his longtime deputy, Lee Hsien Loong, today, Aug 12. The event is not insignificant, but neither does it herald a dramatic change in Singapore's political direction. That's despite some of the speculation swirling around the event, speculation largely based on the different personalities of the prime minister and his successor. Mr Goh is affable, empathetic, and a natural consensus builder. Mr Lee is more intense and analytical, with the conviction of one accustomed to processing complex problems faster than anyone around him. Some assume that he must have an authoritarian streak, because he is the son of Singapore's stern patriarch, Lee Kuan Yew. Too much is made of such differences. For a start, Mr Goh was hardly a pushover. While he may have been more consensual in his style of leadership, he was uncompromising in his mission of preserving the dominant position of the ruling People's Action Party. For all the talk of Singapore loosening up under 14 years of Goh government, prospects for opposition parties look even bleaker now than in the years before he took over. In the last general election, the PAP secured 75% of the popular vote -- a degree of dominance not seen since 1980. As for Mr Lee -- precisely because he was a strong personality in a cabinet led by a consensus-minded prime minister -- there is no reason to believe that he represents some suppressed faction that will finally be able to stamp its style on the state. Instead, he is more correctly regarded as an integral member of the Goh team, and a co-architect of whatever political reforms it instituted. Therefore, tonight's ceremony on the verdant grounds of the Istana, the president's official residence, promises to usher in more of the same. The Goh government pursued three main political goals, all of which are likely to be adopted by the new prime minister, even if there are some changes in his approach to, or emphasis on them. First, the ruling party focused on entrenching itself, believing with almost religious fervor that Singapore's survival depends on the PAP's continued hold on the center. It did so with its characteristic combination of carrots for voters -- through a growing economy -- and sticks for all who challenge it. In dealing with its opponents, the PAP has grown more nuanced and sophisticated in the application of its coercive tools, resulting in fewer mallet-versus-fly encounters than in previous decades. The most significant example has been its self-restraint in the use of the fearsome Internal Security Act, which permits arrest without warrant and detention without trial. The Malaysian government has similar powers, which it has deployed regularly against assorted critics and activists. By contrast, during Mr Goh's 14 years as premier, his government never once used the ISA against non-violent political opponents. This has given the government more legitimacy on those occasions when it has resorted to the ISA -- principally against suspected militants of the Jemaah Islamiyah. More importantly, the rarity of outright repression has allowed a generation of young Singaporeans to grow up believing that political stability is built on ideological consensus rather than fear. Second, the state has embarked on a process of internal reform, spreading the weight of responsibility across more institutional pillars, and providing more creative autonomy to statutory bodies, schools, and other service providers. The government's record here has been mixed, because this goal is in tension with its belief in cohesion and a strong executive branch. The most dramatic example of this tension was a public quarrel between the cabinet and head of state in 1999. Singapore's constitution had been amended to give the president's office more custodial powers. But when the republic's first popularly-elected president, Ong Teng Cheong, tested the limits of his newly strengthened office, the cabinet steered the presidency back to a more traditional, less interventionist role. Internally, the main conundrum has been how to move to a post-LKY era. Government leaders, including the elder statesman himself, know that the political system's domination by one larger-than-life individual is an historical anomaly that will never be repeated. They know they must move toward a more institutionalized, less personality-driven, system. At the same time, the 80-year-old senior minister continues to be regarded as a valuable asset. Hence, the mixed picture of a second and third generation of able leaders emerging, but a continued reliance on the elder Lee to grapple with thorny political issues and provide long-range guidance. From today, the father will serve in the son's cabinet, as he did in Mr Goh's. But, in a highly significant symbolic move, he will give up the title of senior minister and with it the number two rank in protocol. This will go to Mr Goh as the immediate past-prime minister. The elder Lee will instead be given the title of "minister mentor." Thus, the new leadership appears to be signaling that Lee Kuan Yew's continued involvement in government is not "because he is Lee Kuan Yew," but part of an institutionalized system in which past prime ministers remain in cabinet in senior advisory positions for as long as they can contribute. Mr Goh was always conscious of the need to lay the groundwork for the post-LKY era. His successor has shown a similar sensitivity in his first major decision -- the pecking order in his cabinet. The third area of political reform is the most talked about: Singapore's trend to a more open society. The administration by now appears intellectually convinced that wide consultation improves governance and increases the citizen's emotional stake in the nation. Individuals and interest groups have been given more channels to convey their opinions to the government. However, liberalization has been highly selective and carefully managed. The Goh government never reformed the laws that inhibit political expression, such as those controlling the press. It has not become much easier for people to mobilize or organize their fellow citizens toward causes they believe in. Openness is seen as a way to help the government refine its agenda -- not to allow citizens to challenge it. Singapore's political system is not set in stone. There are tensions between goals, different tendencies within government -- which could be described as more hardline or more moderate -- and periods when either reform or consolidation is emphasized. The personalities and values of individual leaders may make a difference
at the margins. However, the PAP has held power for 45 years not by swaying
according to any one individual's whim or passing fancy. This is a ruling
party with a clear sense of its core objectives and abiding interests,
and what it takes to govern a city state in a fast-changing global economy.
It was so under the elder Lee and Mr Goh. It will remain so under Lee Hsien
Loong. Mr George is an assistant professor at the School of Communication
and Information at Nanyang Technological University, and author of "Singapore:
The Air-conditioned Nation" (Landmark Books, 2000). |
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