Contest for space: Civil and political society in east and southeast Asia

Intoduction

CIVIL society is very much a part of and central to political society. To clinically separate the two, is a failure to understand the symbiotic relationship between civil and political society. This clearly is the dilemma that will face civil society in east and southeast Asia through the near to mid-term future.

At the heart of the debate is the disagreement over what is seen as a western definition of civil society, which includes for it a democratic role. Civil society actors via this logic have a right to take direct political action to pursue their causes. This is juxtaposed against an alternative reading of civil society among some political authorities and their associates in the region. They do not see as legitimate political actions by individuals or non-political party groups. For them, civil society is largely pictured as being non-political and working in partnership with government.

The literature on civil society has its origins in western Enlightenment, where the need for citizens to be organised and empowered was rationalised (Rf Fine & Rai, 1997: 7-26; Seligman, 1992: 22). Civil society, drawing from this tradition is still seen as that sector that independently straddles the family and the state. The term civil society and its relationship to democracy has seen a resurgence in recent times with the collapse of the Soviet Union, in particular with the push by civil groups in Eastern Europe for democratic reforms. The resurgence of civil groups in various parts of the world and the role they play in political reform has made civil society important in academic discussions on democracy and political theory (Rf Keane, 1998: 11- 20).

However, this direct political role of civil groups has been challenged by a counter-discourse in the region. A subset of the Asian values argument, some argue that civil society in its "Western" form is unsuitable for Asian societies. Articulated by opinion makers in governments and their allies, there has been an attempt to bring a whole range of organised groups within the ambit of civil society. A clear trend has been to include organised groups connected and funded by the State as part of civil society and thereby, to question or negate altogether, the independent politics of civil society activity. The aim has been to depoliticise civil society and to confine political activity to political parties. This tendency to conceptualise political society in narrow terms is now also reflected in the emerging literature on the subject (Rf Ooi and Koh, 1998). To some extent indirectly supported by sociological readings of civil society that point out that the state itself is not monolithic and state-society relationship need not be seen in dichotomous terms (Rf Hann and Dunn, 1996).

Civil Society as Political Society

In the classical western definition, political philosopher John Locke defines political society as a community of people that have agreed to step out of the state of nature and symbolically hand over authority over themselves to a political system that regulates their behaviour (Rf Lively & Reeve, in "Fine & Rai", 1997).

However, in this community all individuals nevertheless maintain their right to engage the political system. If there is an abuse of power, or if those entrusted with the responsibility of government did not observed the will of the people, then the authority over oneself can be revoked. This notion, with its roots in the theories of social contract, ensures that all citizens retain their right to political activity if they so wish, without being subjected to unreasonable constraints. For this and other purposes it is implicit that the people can organise themselves for action. It is in this broad sense that a political society is conceived.

However, in East and Southeast Asia, their political writings have not conceptualised political society in these terms. Nevertheless, the journey from a monarchical system, through the colonial experience to the present post-independence situation shows that centralised political authority is a feature of the region. In this context, the strategy of ruling forces in Asian history has been to disenfranchise political activity not sanctioned by the centre.

For instance, until lately in Indonesia, the State had permeated society through its extensive network of elected and appointed officials all the way down to the municipal level (Rf Douglass & Friedman, 1998: 130). This had effectively precluded the establishment and functioning of civil society, much like in other conservative regimes where the legal constrictions make non-state initiatives difficult to effect.

The Marcos era in the Philippines and military regimes of South Korea employed less subtle methods of restricting civil participation including repressive legal limitations and physical force in quelling mass demonstrations. In Singapore, the government's social policies and campaigns intruded into all aspects of life and effectively smothered the development of a civil society.

The state of civil society in other parts of the region is also in a somewhat premature or non-existent form because of similar centralised features. Burma stands out as a case in point in this respect. The virtual control of the state under the military junta has preempted any form of civil participation. Save for some groups in exile and the efforts of some members of international civil society, there has been virtually no legitimate engagement by civil society with the political establishment in Burma. In the Indo-Chinese countries of Vietnam and Laos there are varying similarities where the socialist model continues to emphasis central political control. While in Cambodia aggression enforces control.

Nonetheless, political change is not unknown in the region. People in East and southeast Asia have been able to rise above the constraints placed on political participation. From overthrowing tyrannical monarchs through armed rebellions to organising independence movements against their colonial masters serve as ample evidence. In political developments in South Korea, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia following the Asian economic crisis, the region has shown that a political society where people participate widely without or in spite of constraints is very much in the spirit of the Asian tradition.

This shows that even in East and southeast Asia there has been a long tradition of political society, although it has not been distinctively conceptualised as in European scholarship. In fact, the mass agitation and calls for greater democratic freedoms in the past months in some countries and governmental responses to manage them and direct them towards political party activity point to the tensions between definitions of political society and civil participation. Making it necessary that political society is distinctively conceptualised for Asian societies. Principally that political society be more broadly defined than the narrow definition that many centralised political systems in the region are promoting.

Political Society and Theories of Democratic Development

The conservative usage of the term political society has its roots in the trajectory of political development in East and Southeast Asia.

From a historical perspective, efforts at democratisation have had a conservative response in the region largely due to the prevalent notion among elites that a strong state is vital for continued economic growth. The dominance of the State has thus been explained and validated as a function of its developmentalist role. This has been the language largely employed since the immediate post-colonial period (Rf Huntington and Moore, 1970). In the 80s the debate shifted to the middle-class role in the democratisation process. As the regional economies grew, the focus was on the emerging middle-class to agitate for political reform. The prediction by political analysts that economic development would bring about a middle-class that would be pivotal in effecting democratic reform, however, has been largely discredited in the face of still existing conservative and developmentalist authoritarian regimes. (Rf Hewison, Robison and Rodan, 1993) The argument next shifted to Asian values. Cultural and historical precedents were given as causes for the course of political development in Asia. Consequently, there has been a strident rejection of what Asian leaders have termed "western Values" and the desire to maintain a strong state has been justified via the use of the Asian values argument. (Rf Rodan, 1997: 163)

The Asian economic crisis has once again seen the democratic discourse witness yet another revival. With the positive connection between Asian values and economic development negated coupled with the fact that, the Asian crises has exposed the State's inability to effectively monitor all aspects of society. It has directly lead to the burgeoning of democratic sentiment among civil society groups to remove limits to political participation.

Thus, the structural rigidities of a narrowly defined political society, which up to date have inhibited the rise of a vibrant and independent civil society in the past, have become a source for scholarly work. Some of which have been recently published while most are in the process of being written. Overall, the position of civil society and its theoretical contributions to political development are an emerging phenomenon and likely to occupy the academic debate for the next few years.

The Rise of Civil Society in East and Southeast Asia

Much of the present day basis for civil society in Southeast Asia lies in the colonial experience, where the colonial authorities allowed for the formation of local cultural interest groups. These were a mixture of indigenous and migrant ethnic, cultural and religious organisations. Political activity was set firmly in the hands of the colony administrators.

Following the end of the war and the rise of independent states in the region, many different groups emerged. There were independence movements that drew support from the existing social groups in the country as many new ones were formed. Ironically, after gaining independence many of the countries followed a centralist policy that did not encourage the growth of a civil society. Where they did emerge, they were closely linked to the state in terms of policy and funding and were akin to mass society. International civil society was largely not welcome in many countries, especially if they broached on the political, except for developmental ones, which were crucial for the region's progress.

The last few decades, however, have slowly seen an increase in civil society activity through a mixture of forces. At the home front, governments have facilitated the formation of local groups for many areas of the social sector. Many of these groups work closely with the governments and are closely linked through funding and patronage. On the global level, international civil society has impacted the region by encouraging and supporting local indigenous groups to spring up and take up global concerns at the local level. Overall there has been a proliferation of civil groups in the region. (Rf Yamamoto, 1995).

However, the phenomenal political changes of the recent months have seen more civil society groups becoming active in their struggle to create political space. There is an indication that civil society is burgeoning, supported both by globalisation and a genuine desire on the part of the citizenry to play a more participatory role in society. This now poses a new challenge to many governments.

In Indonesia for example, the virtual collapse of the State has led to a proliferation of organisations, both old and new, attempting to mediate change and renewal. An interesting trend prevalent in, but not particular to Indonesia, is the increasing conflation and reconfiguration of the once demarcated relationship between political and civil society. For example, the largest religious organisation in the country, the Nadhatul Ulama has harnessed its considerable religious-social popularity as a function of political activity(Jakarta Post May 8,1999). This importance of these groups has been made evident in the Indonesia elections in June 1999.

The South Korean experience is also instructive in tracing the growth of civil society in a state that had deteriorated democratically under military dictatorships to its present circumstances under the Kim Dae Jung government. In the South Korean case, the establishment of formal democracy has seen the Government engaging Non-Governmental Organisations in issues ranging from labour reform to re-unification with its North Korean neighbour (Korea Times Jan 2,1999). However, the call for the further inclusion of civil society actors in the policy making process is still a frequent one even in the rapidly progressing South Korean society.

In Malaysia too, there has been an increasing tendency to engage the political as evidenced by the stands taken by civic groups such as SUARAM and the Bar Council during recent political events (The New Straits Times Nov 11, 1998). The response from the government sector most recently has been to respond through legislative means. Organisations registered as businesses now run the risk of being closed down.

The recent Falun protests that silently flowed through the streets of Beijing give further indication that civil society groups take all forms of independent action that contest the State's dominance and serve primarily to articulate the sentiments of the people. Demonstrations have become commonplace in China as a restive population -- concerned about corruption and unemployment -- appears increasingly willing to take to the streets to press its demands (Washington Post Foreign World Service Apr 26,1999). The protests over the bombing of the Chinese embassy in the Kosovo incident is yet another recent case in point. This shows that even in China there is a need to incorporate the voices of non-state actors and provide for a greater scope for interest articulation from outside the party apparatus (The Straits Times May 19, 1999).

In Vietnam, the prevalence of corruption and lack of accountability has seen the peasant community pressing for greater transparency from the Communist government portending the development of civil society in this one-party state (Far Eastern Economic Review Feb 4, 1998). These and other similar occurrences in the past months point to the political role that civil society is playing in the various countries. Some, more organised than others.

Political authorities have responded by trying to contain the political dimensions of civil society participation. Currently, political authorities and their partners are attempting to shape and push civil society into non-controversial areas or to co-opt the leadership of progressive initiatives. When civil society elements directly confront the political authorities on political matters, they are "pushed" into the political party arena where the dominant forces already have a monopoly of the political space.

Such measures of containing civil society are supplemented with the use of legislation and/or to recast the discourse of civil society in non-political terms. This is accompanied by a warning that direct participation by the citizenry will result in chaos, ethnic violence and disruption of the economy. There is a concerted effort to define political society as an area only for political parties and to argue that organised groups in society should not agitate for political reform from a non-political party forum. This process has resulted in some civil society groups as well as individuals rationalising their actions along this principle. The section below elaborates on some of these strategies and evaluates the implications.

Strategies to Depoliticise Civil Society

Defining political society in political party terms brings to fore several problems. For instance when it comes to political participation, it severely restricts the role of the private citizen who is not a member of a political party. Is the citizen only to act as a voter to cast his or her ballot during elections? Or in the Singapore case, limit his or her participation to giving feedback and raising comments in sanctioned discussion groups? Is there no scope for the citizen to participate as an individual without enrolling in a political party?

Political participation goes beyond political party activity. It involves private citizen initiative at many levels to organise and raise issues through a variety of mechanisms. Beyond that, the individual, citizen groups too can organise and raise politically relevant issues without restricting themselves to the political party mechanism. Political participation, being wide, requires us to think beyond political party activity when we speak of political society.

In Singapore, the ruling PAP has tried to define political participation in narrow terms. It directs any spontaneous political activity or commentary by individuals or groups towards opposition parties. Or it reacts to them politically as opposition party activity or activists. This is understandable but not necessarily excusable, for as the dominant political force, the PAP designs political participation in such narrow terms for its own strategic advantage.

This has had a spillover effect that has led some commentators and lay people to also accept politics in such narrow terms. However, once again, this should not prevent a review of a narrowly defined notion of politics.

Even if we want to contemplate equating political society with the activity of political parties, such a proposition must ensure that there exists a reasonably level playing field for such conduct. Restrictions on freedom of association, freedom of expression and unwarranted restrictions on political party activities should not exist in the acute form that it does in some parts of the region. Opposition political parties in many countries in the region, face severe difficulties to engage in "political society". After contesting general elections, all other periods in between become a constant struggle against the machinery of a one party dominant state. This is notably the case in Singapore and to some extent, Malaysia.

Other countries have an even more rigid form of political society. In Indonesia until the post-Suharto era, political society was constitutionally limited to three opposition political parties sanctioned by the ruling Golkar. In China and Vietnam, the ruling Communist Party constitutionally remains the defacto political society.

Political and civil rights therefore need to be guaranteed and safeguarded and not smothered by calls to observe responsibility. Alternative political activity should not be treated as illegitimate and criminal but a genuine part of everyday activity. If such conditions do not exist, then it is not meaningful to speak of a "political society" in political party terms.

Commentators, by separating civil and political society in such a clinical manner, also fail to acknowledge the role of civil society in the political process. Civil society, in addition to its role as a service provider and an vehicle for articulating specific views for the community, is often looked upon to contribute to the democratisation process.

In addition to political party actors, civil society groups and their members are seen as another set of actors coming together to urge reforms to the constitution and to ensure that democratic governance is in place.

Frequently, civil society has been forced into this role because "political society" in political party terms does not meaningfully exist. The ruling political authorities monopolise the space within "political society" so much so that other political parties can barely survive. In some cases when the political party is all pervasive, with collaborative partners from industry, military and the civil service the political party in reality exists as an oligarchical elite. This causes demand for political reform to be channeled through another mechanism, that is, civil society. Cases in Thailand, Indonesia and most recently in Malaysia where citizen groups have come together to demand for reform illustrate this point. Ranging from farmers in Thailand, students in Indonesia and a range of disparate groups in Malaysia, civil society groups have, in addition to their sectional role, have come together to urge for political reforms.

In Japan too, there seems to be a sea of change in the traditional attitudes to political participation. Japanese women, for example, are slowly asserting their interests in the traditionally male-dominated political arena and are becoming politically involved by projecting their civil rights as participants of political society (Washington Post Foreign Service May 9, 1999). Governments in Japan and China, unlike before, now have to contend with greater calls for transparency and accountability from various traditionally quiet segments in their society. One consequence of such activity is that governments in east and southeast Asia have recognised that there is a new emerging force of democratisation. In reaction, conservative regimes in the region have adopted a variety of strategies to deal with this new development.

A method adopted has been to urge civil society groups to be non-partisan. Civil society groups are asked not to directly challenge the prevailing regime. Instead they are encouraged or challenged to use the political party system and to contest elections. This has been the rhetoric employed in the Malaysian case. The newly formed Keadilan (The National Justice Party) is one example of the consequence of such a process.

By pushing individuals and groups into the political party realm, it becomes easier for the dominant political authorities to better manage the actors behind these emerging democratic forces. This task is made easier because the incumbent political authorities already dominate the political party space.

In other instances, such as in Thailand, civil society groups are coaxed to be partners of the ruling authority to help in policy discussion and formulation. In Singapore, civil society is asked to focus on complementing the state in the distribution of services and to encourage more volunteerism within the community. In Cambodia for instance, authorities are drawing up legislation to establish an independent body that will monitor logging policies, possibly in conjunction with non-governmental groups. (TIME ASIA, Apr 19, 1999) While in China, underpinned by a communist ideology, almost all civic activity is led by and closely linked to the state. . Such measures to keep the political distinct have been successful. Many civil society groups now have begun to use the same rhetoric to insist that they are non-partisan and that they will avoid affiliating themselves with any cause that is political.

A principle strategy is to argue that in order to protect their interests that they must use the language of government. They also see "engaging" the state as another strategy. By working with the state they feel they are protected and more importantly that they can still do their work and make incremental gains. The result of this approach is that much of what these civil society groups want to articulate is lost to the excessive use of euphemism when it comes to matters political. The result is that crucial issues continue to be obscured by politically correct rhetoric and catchphrases.

Although the above strategy is attractive and is subscribed to by many, the successes of this method of engagement shows how effective conservative governments and political authorities have been in cultivating and supporting such a viewpoint. In doing so, these conservative forces effectively checkmate progressive elements which want to be independent and take a more direct approach in trying to initiate political reforms.

This also makes the contribution or partnership with members of international civil society as well agencies from other countries difficult. Often collaboration with international partners are seen as dangerous or detrimental to local efforts for civil action. Collaborative efforts between local groups and international are often aggressively denounced in state controlled media as unpatriotic partnerships that seek to destabilse the domestic political authority to the use of "foreign" funds. One extreme example is the erection of billboards in Malaysia to warn against the interference of foreign elements. However, when local groups rely on government funding they find they have to follow guidelines if not risk loosing funding for their programmes. Such "guidelines" pertain to following government policies on certain issues and matters of direct political action. The possibility of such an incident occuring is one of the reason why many NGOs in Thailand which enjoy a fair bit of autonomy are reluctant to make use of the Social Improvement Fund (SIF) set up by the government.

In this respect, observers will note that in many countries in the region, there is reluctance on the part of some governments to include independent political discussion groups, policy groups or others such as human rights groups into the category of civil society. Groups such as these frequently adopt an adversarial stance against the establishment. As such, these groups seldom get recognition as members of civil society but are treated as political contenders, especially when such groups cannot secure local funds and rely on foreign contributions. Often to neutralise their presence the state sets up a similar mechanism as a government initiative and pulls the carpet from under the feet of the civil society activists. An example from Malaysia is the setting up of a National Human Rights Commission in the wake of local NGOs activities to draw attention to human rights issues.

Alternatively, the strategy of the conservative elements is to portray these civil society forces in a negative light. Generally most political authorities do not have a problem with those that provide welfare services or suggestions from equally conservative elements. The same segments in the polity also survive when they allow the authorities either to co-opt them as opinion makers or by going along with the final decision of government. What is problematic to the dominant regimes is when these groups become confrontational and raise issues that question the legitimacy of those in power and their right to political authority. When this occurs, such groups are painted as chaotic, the source of problems, collaborators of foreign powers and the ones likely to lead the country into civil strife. Such rhetoric is not unconvincing if there is tight media control with vivid pictures to support that story. The Singapore case is especially telling, as there is a dearth of such independent groups since prevailing legislation does not encourage the formation of such organisations.

To further manage the emerging democratic force of civil society, political authorities in the region try to include within the ambit of civil society, groups and organisations that have direct links with them. Government-sponsored groups and organisation whose formations have been initiated and supported by the authorities in power, for instance, are now pushed forward as members of civil society.

In Indonesia, institutions such as Golkar and the military therefore continue to play an important role in spite of the outcomes of the June elections in 1999. The strong showing by Megawati's PDI, for instance does not instantly guarantee the presidential post as the other factors that shape the final votes that make up parliament need to be considered. In other countries such as Malaysia and Singapore organisations linked to ruling the political authorities that are involved in the provision of services and the generation of income are put forward as genuine social actors. There are numerous examples in each country in the region.

Some examples from Singapore would be the PAP kindergarten centres, the NTUC FairPrice Supermarket chain, NTUC Income, NTUC Comfort taxi services, the People's Association, the various grassroots organisations and direct service providers that are closely linked to the political authorities because of funding.

By including politically sponsored and linked groups into civil space, the push by some members of civil society to adopt a more reformist posture is immediately faced with a built-in counter objection by another set of actors. In this way political authorities in the region stand to successfully dilute the space of civil society and exercise some measure of indirect control over some of its more progressive actors.

Participation of foreigners in a given country also remains a relatively under-explored area. Up to date most foreign communities limit their activities to charity in the host country or to some form of limited cultural participation for members of their own communities. They remain outside the mainstream of civil society organisations, especially in those areas that might be considered socio-political. With increased globalisation where migration patterns change and people hold multiple residencies and no longer die in the places they were born, this will be an issue for the future of civil society in Asia and the rest of the world. The participation of foreigners in local civil society needs to move beyond from charity and culture to make their residencies in foreign land meaningful. Presently when there is a strong anti foreign interference discourse, any attempt to progressively think about foreigners in local civil society is likely to be curtailed because of suspicion.

Similarly, contributions by citizens living, working or studying abroad to their national civil society is another area that will increasingly be an issue for the future of civil society in Asia. In particular how participation and jurisdiction is conceptualised. Civil activity that transgresses borders, where citizens living in a third country organise for action for their homeland as well foreigners residing abroad to organise for another country, is something that is frowned upon. Yet something that is increasingly hard to avoid and control. This is a phenomenon that is already taking place in the arena of the Internet. There are websites that, because of domestic regulations, are hosted by servers located in third countries. With more countries in the region witnessing a growth of Internet subscribes the pressure on this area will grow. The internet provides a limited avenue how civil society in Asia might negotiate the "foreign" element in an increasingly globalised world.

Asian countries are also responding by setting up their own foundations to send their messages abroad. The Singapore International Foundation, and until before the crisis, the desire to set up a Thai Cultural Foundation, reflect the desire of East and Southeast Asian nations to actuate civil society initiatives according to their philosophical viewpoints in the international arena. The Japan Foundation too, among other Japanese foundations, is of course well known in this respect. In Korea, there is the Kim Dae Jung Foundation and the Forum for Democratic Leaders in the Asia Pacific. Likewise, the Cory Aquino Foundation has sought to mark the democratic turning point in the region by supporting and concretising liberal democratic ideals. Other countries that do not specifically have foundations abroad, continue to use their consular offices abroad to put forward their different agendas.

Collectively, all of the above vividly assert to the tension between civil and political society and the difficulties involved in redefining the body politic. It underscores that the attempts to clinically separate the two will be increasingly counterproductive.

Conclusion: Creating Political Space for Civil Society

Conservative regimes in the region continue to grapple with the demand for greater political participation. The response has been to reconcile the demand for greater political participation by trying to de-link the democratic role from the other functions of civil society. A culmination of this can be seen in the attempt by commentators to insist on the difference between western and Asian conceptions of civil society, primarily in terms of its democratic role. However, this will be increasingly difficult in a globalising world.

To avoid this dichotomization exercise, we can see civil society as political society to account for contemporary developments.

For political society to exist, that in which all citizens have a legitimate right to participate, what is needed is political space. This is an area of uninhibited articulation and organisation where any political authority using the structures of the state cannot arbitrarily control or inhibit the political will of the people.

Those using this space will be act in a responsible manner in keeping with social norms. Where such issues of responsibility are in question, then the lack of clarity in these issues can be subjected to the laws of the land. Here the due judicial processes must be allowed to arbitrate on the matter without interference from the executive. There must also be a free press and freedom of access to information.

Habitually it is at this juncture that conservative governments in the region invoke the "values" argument. They question the consequence of allowing individuals and groups whose motives and character the executive cannot pre-judge.

This is an old argument frequently used to retard the political process but not without force for some. However, the recourse to this argument is increasing difficult to maintain as the aftermath of the Asian economic crisis makes the politics of participation difficult to ignore.

Political society is more than political parties contesting for dominance for governmental power. It is a community that provides for political space not arbitrarily controlled by an executive. It allows for all its members to be politically and responsibly active, to participate at every level and to explore a variety of mechanisms. Towards this end, the civil and political rights of the members in this community are guaranteed and protected.

Thus civil society can no longer be confined only to NGO representations or group actors. Individuals as free agents can also be private contributors to the process. Only when we recognise the width and breath of political society as being larger than that of political party activity will civil society become meaningful.

This paper was first presented at the 13th Asia Pacific Roundtable organised by the Insititute of Strategic and International Studies under the auspices of the ASEAN-ISIS network, 31st May to 3 June 1999, Shangri-la Hotel, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

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