Lee, the elected president and brake fluid

"It was my proposal," said Lee Kuan Yew referring to the elected president in a recent interview with the Straits Times (August 12, 1999). [transcript available]

With that pithy statement, the "chief architect" of the elected president (EP) has, not unexpectedly, emerged to disabuse those who conjured apparitions that the EP was some dashing white knight to check the PAP government.

Lee's rhetorical question that Singapore's Westminster model of parliamentary democracy "... has worked, so do we want to alter the system?" is especially interesting. Especially, if some future government acts on another one of Lee's proposals of tinkering with the "one man one vote" system - another fundamental feature of the Westminster model.

It is probable that the Westminster model of democracy would then not be working for Singapore at that point in time.

This chameleon-like quality of Singapore's Westminster model of democracy at best, would be correctly viewed as constitutional dynamism or what my NUS constitutional law lecturer would animatedly intone parliamentary supremacy.

At worst, such malleability of Singapore's Westminster model of democracy in opportunistic hands would be prone to abuse by a capricious and fickle government. This begs the question that we may want to perhaps broaden the mandate of the EP to prevent a future government from tinkering the one-man one-vote system, in addition to protecting the reserves and checking on government appointments.

The lack of an EP contest leaves Lee unfazed because according to Lee, his own walkovers in past parliamentary general elections shows that when no one runs, people know that they don't have a chance to win. Therefore, there is no contest in the EP because potential candidates knew they could not beat the cabinet's pick.

However, Lee's rationale is somewhat weak. The mandate and nature of parliamentary general elections is different from the EP. For parliamentary general elections, Lee only had to rely on his well-known record of serving his constituents and Singapore in such elections. His constituents will vote him on that basis and what they know of Lee.

For an EP election, unless the candidate is some ex-cabinet minister, the candidates for the EP are largely unknown, untested and untried. Having an election with debates, probative media scrutiny and voter examination, would help the population learn more about the EP candidate and make an educated and informed decision over the man who is to guard our reserves.

Also an MP's election at parliamentary elections is on grounds that are also very different from an EP. An MP's electability is on the basis of his ability to promise, serve and deliver (according to the 1997 elections, it was HDB upgrading) to his constituents. The raw retail politicking of providing "pork."

The EP is elected on his ability to stop a rogue spendthrift government intent on running down the reserves by "bribing" the electorate. Therefore, an MP gets voted on the basis of a political pork provider and the EP is a political pork depriver.

Having an EP candidate to go through the educational process of the hustings would be a baptism of fire. The candidate EP will be made to work for his job and tests his mental stamina and sharpen his touch with the common folks out there. The hurly burly of the weeding process of a poll is more useful than allowing the EP to waltz into the Istana untested.

Having the EP candidate probed and speak during elections is far better for the electorate than relying on freshly dredged glowing testimonies or rosy hued reminiscences of the candidate's old colleagues, previous subordinates or superiors or long lost buddies swapping endearing stories. Singaporeans are supposed to be choosing a person to guard our hard-earned reserves not screen candidates for a potential marriage partner for a widowed grandmother!

Perhaps, the most cogent reason for having an election is that the EP is supposed to be an elected president.

I suspect that the undeclared reason why the PAP did not "nudge" out another EP candidate for competition this time is that it probably wanted to avoid a repeat of Chua Kim Yeow's 1993 non-PAP supported, non-campaign for EP.

A repeat or an improvement of Chua's harvest of 41.3 percent of the popular vote - notwithstanding Chua's praise that DPM Ong was the better candidate during the hustings - could, in these troubling economic times, be viewed as a failing grade on the PAP's current performance in the current recession.

In view of the persistent worries about our economy, Singaporeans are justifiably nervy about Singapore's reserves and its protection. Or more importantly, it is the PAP that is nervy about Singaporeans' view of the economy and the reserves. It is likely that the people would have voted the non-PAP backed EP candidate merely on the basis that the EP candidate was not PAP-backed, thereby sending a warning to the PAP that the electorate should not be taken for granted.

The electorate would probably want to hold the PAP to its word to steer the economy back on the track of prosperity or else its payback time at the next parliamentary general elections. A defeat for the PAP-backed candidate in a contested EP is the hors d'oeuvre.

Just as the voters could be cajoled and induced into voting for the PAP in return for HDB upgrading, Singaporeans would probably not hesitate in turning against the PAP at a EP election as a warning shot that the economy had better improve the next election or else.

This is the price to pay as the PAP resorted to only seduce the pocket-books of voters with HDB upgrading, rather than trying to win the hearts and minds of Singapore voters in the 1997 general elections.

Therefore, by avoiding a full-blown non-contest of a contest (if the 1993 EP is any gauge) in the upcoming August 28, 1999 EP poll, the PAP has averted the chance of letting the EP election be a shadow referendum on the PAP's handling of the current economic crisis.

Recent discouraging economic news like the government's Suzhou investments may not have necessarily developed to Singapore's advantage, CPF cuts, depressed property prices are all the prime ingredients for a voter backlash.

What could conceivably be the issues if there was an EP poll? The economy, stupid! The raison d'etre of the EP is money or rather protecting our money. It would not be surprising that the economy would be front and center of any election right now, be it an EP poll or a by-election for Jalan Besar GRC.

Since it is a given that the EP is not an executive president, then the question may be what the EP would do if a government were to use the reserves in trying to eke an economic recovery? It could also be probable whether the EP would permit the reserves to bail out any government losses from fouled-up investments by various statutory boards and GLCs. There is also bound to be debates of the exact scope of the president's powers and interaction with the cabinet.

An open and free EP election with a PAP-backed candidate and a non-PAP backed candidate "nudged" out the closet by the PAP, would have seen the PAP setting up a possibly unpredictable election, the process and issues raised in the election and not the result. Politically sensitive and threatening issues like the PAP's performance in the economy could be brought out into the open and left out to boil and fester in the open.

A result of the PAP-backed candidate losing or winning by a very narrow victory for the PAP-backed candidate would have been ammunition for the opposition to declare the electorate is not satisfied with the PAP's current stewardship of the economy.

Creating the momentum for some real opposition gains in the next general elections for parliament. In short, having an EP election now, would be distracting Singaporeans from focusing on how to dig itself out of the recession.

Lee's further comments that when an activist cabinet minister gets into the EP job, it is the ex-cabinet minister "must change [his] mindset" is in stark contrast to President Ong's valedictory exhortation that it's the civil service, and presumably, the cabinet, who should change the mindset about the EP.

Lee is, perhaps, laying down the law that an EP should know where the EP stands in the pecking order of Singapore political life.

Lee is definitely correct that the EP is and never will be an executive president. The president has to act on the advice of the cabinet and is not allowed to go on policy frolics on his own.

I would view the EP is an emergency brake blocking a "rogue government" spending our reserves or making bad appointments. But like most brakes, it needs some brake fluid and independent and impartial information about the rationale of the proposed expenditure is that brake fluid.

There is probably the necessity for an independent ombudsmen body to collate, retrieve and analyze the information.

An EP has to invariably sing the libretto composed, arranged, prepared and performed by the one and only executive, the cabinet. However, there comes a time when the EP has to go solo. But unlike tenors who are usually born talented, making decisions about vetoing proposed expenditure of copious amounts of other people's money requires strict scrutiny of the information.

Usually, such information should be independent and from an independent information retrieval and gathering unit.

My concern is that the little discretion that the EP has, must be exercised and based upon, at the very least, impartial information, independent of what the government is whipping up or spinning out to support airy spending schemes or plans.

What is the basis for the EP to conclude that the government is squandering its reserves? No matter how much Lee may wax lyrically about the caliber, the gravitas or the grace of those who become the EP - the goalkeeper EP has got to have the right equipment if he is going to play the game.

I am loathe to use this example but it is the easiest that comes to mind. The US executive and legislative branches have their own independent set of dismal scientists - the economists - gathering, churning out, sifting and assaying the facts and figures about Federal, Congressional and every kind of spending.

In Singapore, the EP was going to have to wait for some 54 man-years just to find out what we have. Enough said.

The EP has to examine independent facts and analysis for the rationale of government spending from objective sources, or at least there has got be to the appearance that there is some objectivity about it.

President Ong had highlighted that the EP has to rely on the civil service as the current Istana staff is woefully inadequate to crunch the numbers - perhaps akin to a HDB provision shop owner in an inventory stocktaking contest against WalMart.

While the current liveried Istana staff may be equipped to throw a fine ceremonial dinner, I guess that in examining the merits of vetoing the government's investment decisions, requires something more than fine bone china and silver.

The decision-making role of the EP was also touched upon by Lee as what comes to the EP is "the final summary of the position: this is what has been going on, this is what the government is going to do; does it infringe the rights of the EP?" So apparently, the EP has to totally rely on the Civil Service to provide this information.

If the Civil Service is also supposed to serve the government in power and if the civil service-prepared facts and figures are those that the government uses to make a decision is also provided to the EP, almost invariably, the EP should reach the same decision as the government.

A "summary" can hardly provide the objectivity and candor that an EP needs when making a decision to allow the government to dip into the reserves.

At this stage, I would like to revisit another Lee interview two years ago, about another one of his proposals:

Lee: "I give you an illustration of how I came to choose Suzhou. You've [Lee was speaking to US ex-ambassador Henry Grunwald] heard about Suzhou, where we're building up an industrial park? I went there about four or five years ago. I had lunch with the governor of the province, and this mayor, a young fellow, about 40 plus, pulled me aside and said, 'You have $50 billion in reserves,' all in English, he spoke good English. 'And why don't you put 10 percent in Suzhou? I will make sure that you succeed.' I looked at him and I said, 'Well, good mayors get promoted very soon. Then what happens to my 10 percent?' I had expected a stock communist reply--'Don't worry.' He paused. He said, 'Well, you might have some trouble at the beginning with my successor, but he will have no choice. The people here have read what's going on in Singapore. They want jobs. He will have to go along with you.' So, I said to him, 'But you haven't got the power to give me a piece of land and start to build a little township.' He said, 'I will try. I will go to the center [Beijing].' He then bypassed the governor. He went straight to Deng Xiaopeng's office - - he knew a son - -and he got through." (INTERVIEW Singapore's Senior Minister on handling China, TIME, April 7, 1997 VOL. 149 NO. 14.)

The rest about Suzhou, as they say, is history.

The mention of Singapore's reserves in the TIME interview is poignant in light of the brouhaha over the August 28, 1999 election - or rather the absence thereof - of Singapore's elected president (EP).

It occurred to me that when the Chinese mayor suggested about putting 10 percent of Singapore's reserves in Suzhou, he may have known that the EP (in effect since 1992) could not have vetoed such a 10 percent proposition. Probably for the sake of Henry Grunwald's TIME interview, Lee may have thought that it wasn't necessary to lengthen or lace a compelling retelling of the genesis of Suzhou with boring arcane intricacies about Singapore's Constitution, the delicate check and balance system Lee carefully proposed, crafted and debated and the EP's "second key" a la goalkeeper of Singapore's reserves.

Just to set the record straight, Singapore's reserves were not used in Singapore's investment with Suzhou.

In the parliamentary wake over Suzhou, BG Lee was reported by the Straits Time to have "quashed" talk about the alleged billions squandered and set the record straight that Singapore's statutory boards and GLCs had only put US$147 million into the Suzhou project.

Consider a purely theoretical scenario: Suppose a future Singapore government embarks on some expensive high-profile international prestige project, say for example, a hi-tech overseas e-commerce business project. It may cost about, a totally whimsical figure of 10 percent of Singapore's reserves. Let's say that, conjecturally of course, the full weight of the government apparatus, the cream of the civil service, trade unions, NMPs, top NUS economists and business leaders universally acclaim and support the plan to spend those reserves because the projected returns were too good to be true.

The population is fed with a daily frenzied media campaign fawning abundant praise - with vespers-like regularity - of the project's benefits being the greatest thing to hit Singapore since air-conditioning.

The question to ask is not whether the Singapore EP will have the temerity to veto that plan but rather would the Singapore EP have any other reliable source of information to base his decision to veto or not on.

In the kingdom of the blind, the one eyed man is king. I just wish for the EP to have that one eye when it matters. Would the Singapore EP be able to have all the relevant information, data and market intelligence that it has to come to a reasoned and brave decision to stop the government?

Admittedly it would appear that the current PAP administration did not spend 10 percent of our reserves in Suzhou (by the way, what is the amount of our reserves exactly?). Of course, the PAP is no rogue government drunkenly traipsing down the road to Suzhou infamy.

For Suzhou, it may have merely made a bad business decision. The only redeeming quality about the Suzhou debacle is that the PAP eventually pulled the plug and it didn't leave it to fester and drain the government's energies, resources and our money.

However, this does not mean that the government is out of the woods in the blame department by crying business is risky! While a private business parleys with its own or at least its shareholder's money, governments should be far more punctilious and more importantly, transparent, or perhaps, reconsider whether it should be involved in overseas business adventures such as these.

Just as Singaporeans should be protected against a spendthrift government, intent on squandering the reserves by bribing the populace, Singaporeans should also be protected or insulated against a government repeatedly committing expensive business mistakes.

Presumably the narrow mandate of the EP is also broad enough to tackle a government with "less skills" in the arena of making international investments with the nation's reserves. If the EP does not, the fault lies not in our stars but in ourselves.